The National Resistance Movement and its main rival the Forum for Democratic Change have separately dismissed the idea of a coalition government ahead of the 2011 polls.
NRM Chief Whip Daudi Migereko led the NRM side to a recent tête-à-tête with other political forces, including the FDC, said his party’s intention is to win the 2011 polls “decisively”.
The dialogue organized by Accra based Institute of Economic Affairs- a Think Tank famous for organizing Presidential Debates between Ghana’s bitter rivals in the last election- was assisted by a Hague based Dutch NGO- the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy.
On Friday the European Union head in Uganda Ambassador Vincent De Visscher said talk of a coalition government in 2011 was speculation saying of more concern would be the cohesiveness of the political opposition.
“From a donor view point we are interested in a clean process and a level playing field. There are concerns about trust in the Electoral Commission because elections are like a football march where if the referee is discredited the results cannot be credible” he said adding that donors were “absolutely not” planning a government of national unity.
He was responding to a report carried in the Weekly Observer about a donor driven plot for a power-sharing deal arising out of the Ghana meet.
The report said fears of violence in 2011 had caused donors to moot the idea of a coalition.
But Mr. Migereko also said no discussion over a coalition had taken place in Ghana but that NRM had an open door to dialogue about the “rules of the game”.
“Politics is about competition and we are working hard to win” Migereko said when asked directly about the slow slide in the popularity of NRM Chairman Yoweri Museveni.
Those who predict violence say it would be difficult for him to win the next election/
Mr. Museveni has consistently lost by 10 % in the last three major elections [75% in 1996, 65% in 2001 and 59% in 2006]. All things holding steady he would be in a statistical red in the next poll.
Migereko says NRM is confident it can “reverse” the trend.
FDC reject a Museveni partnership
FDC National Chairman Sam Njuba, who like FDC leader Kizza Besigye have worked closely with Mr. Museveni but fell out before the return of multiparty democratic competition, dismissed the idea of a government of national unity.
“No. Never! That’s totally unacceptable. Either we win rightly or lose rightly. While we have not discussed it within FDC I would oppose it. Ha-ha! Working with Museveni? He is a crook. I can’t stomach the thought!” Mr. Njuba said emphatically in a phone interview on Friday morning.
He warned that donors should not “reward” losers of elections with the option of staying in power. “My concern is however that the opposition parties are not so united” he said.
But Migereko who said the Ghana talks were about agreeing to “the rules of the game” earlier on added that cabinet proposals on electoral reforms would not include a suggestion that a “simple majority” should determine the winner of the next elections.
The reforms will be tabled before parliament soon he said. “Dealing with a simple majority is always easier” he said adding that it cannot be ruled out that some NRM members of parliament “may privately seek to amend [the 51+] rule”.
Abolishing the rule would require a constitutional amendment of article 103 [4] which currently require that a winner of the presidential race must win “more than 50% of all the valid votes cast”. A subsection provides for a re-run [see analysis].
Mr. Njuba says FDC would not be surprised if the NRM moved towards the amendment of the constitution because its candidate would likely be unable lose the election.
“We won’t be surprised if that too is pushed down our throat but we will oppose it” he said.

submitted for the Daily Monitor

Victorious in many battles in the Great Lakes Region, veteran soldier Gen James Kazini was this morning found dead in the house of a woman friend in Namwongo Lydia Draru – a Kampala residential area. Details are scanty but bound to spout conspiracy theories for weeks if not years to come.

The General was apparently left his official residence in the morning to return to the home of the individual. Nieghbors heard a scuffle and after all was done Ms Draru made several calls to say she had killed the military man.

Its however unclear if police have made a positive connection between the alleged weapon used to kill Gen Kazini and his wounds. There are whispers about accomplices and the mention of money has been made.

Several senior military men including Gen Kale Kayihura and Gen Kahinda Otafiire who variously served with Kazini in the DRC came to the scene. Kayihura who heads the Uganda police is leading an inquiry into the death.

By the time he died Kazini was on trial for causing ghosts on the UPDF payroll and had in a confidential report [ which later leaked] been accused of treason.

Kazini and ghosts

“I am Maj Gen James Kazini RO 1331”.

And so begun the controversial testimony of one of the most colorful officers to come out of the Ugandan military stable in the last two decades.
The now infamous “Ghost Soldier”, a confidential document of the role of Kazini and others in allegedly padding the army payroll was leaked to the press. As a result of the inquiry Gen. Kazini lost is commission as Army Commander and briefly let the country for a military course at a senior officers academy in Nigeria.
Since his return Kazini has been facing a lengthy trial over the ghost soldier issue but a final decision by the Gen. Court Martial has been delayed as his lawyers petitioned civilian courts. The Ghost Soldier report may have tumbled his career but was also a harsh indictment of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces and expedited several aspects of its recent program of professionalization like the proper account of force numbers and payment of salaries.
Kazini in his testimony, before among others Gen Salim Saleh [President Yoweri Museveni’s brother] and General David Tinyefuza [currently Coordinator of Intelligence services], said Uganda had “ no standing army”.
The committee was chaired by Hon Amama Mbabazi- now Security Minister and NRM Secretary General.
At one point Gen Kazini who said ghosts on the UPDF payroll had been discovered since 1996 claimed an entire Brigade 405 had been deleted from the books to reduce the strength size. He also told the committee that UPDF record keeping was so bad that it could not say how many soldiers it had.
This he said was because the system of issuing service numbers which identify military officers had been diluted by “NYA’s” or Not Yet Admitted- a term that referred to recruits whose commission had not been confirmed but were serving in the army.
The General also claimed that UPDF numbers were only boosted by militias like the [ Arrow Boys and Amuka] and recommended “redocumentation”. The Ghost Soldier report also revealed tensions among the leadership of the army- with Kazini who was accused of having problems with his juniors- counter accusing others of intrigue and career sabotage.
“ That me I did not go to school. That is up to the C.I.C [ Commander in Chief Yoweri Museveni]. The knowledge I have maybe he appreciated it that is why gave me that appointment. To me it’s not conflict, its just undermining authority” he said.
However despite his defense the case was referred for prosecution. The report of the committee itself was harsh in its conclusion and recommended a death sentence for anyone, including Kazini, if found guilty of creating ghosts.

During the historic race between US President Barack Obama and John McCain which briefly displaced the soccer mania on Ugandan televisions- a political difference shone through the silver screen.
It’s the distinct ideological colors that both men, one white and the other black, one, the other young, projected.
A mainstay of American politics; what it means to be Republican or Democrat is now taken for granted. The choice between a right leaning war hero, career senator like McCain and his newbie democratic challenger from Chicago is often examined by the direction their ideologies drive their policies.
It’s not limited to the record of their respective republican or democratic governments while in office. For many a Ugandan watching the back and forth at Presidential debates and numerous town hall meetings; the fact that Obama was a black man stood out.
While unrelated, the stunted presence of ideological choices for the Ugandan voter is a primer of the nature of electoral competition in the country. Ballot day choices are less nuanced or issue based and co-ethnicity is a major influence. In parliament elected leaders coalesce around tribal caucuses which like the Buganda caucus or Acholi Parliamentary group which behave more cohesively than the political parties when tribal issues are at stake.
Local elections, according to political analysts, are often determined by how candidate’s alliances at a national stage influence his or her constituencies’ ethnic preferences. And indeed sometimes where ethnic quarrels like “sharing the national cake” are on the table- the option to respond to them as policy issues is trumped by the force of the political mob.
For example over the years demands by the Buganda Kingdom for special status has been made on the basis that if it existed in a federal relationship – its fortunes particularly economic would change.
“The Baganda are the largest ethnic group in Uganda, yet when it comes to politics they behave like an imperiled minority” wrote Ugandan professor Mahmood Mamdani recently. A recent analysis of economic welfare by ethnicity conducted by a local Think Tank shows why this can be misleading.
While as Mamdani points Buganda behaves like a disadvantaged minority – it is top in a composite ranking of major ethnic groupings [see figures]

There is no left of center or right of center. Instead what we have is the sitting government and its opponents captured by the campaign slogan of “Agenda” [Let him go!] of Dr. Besigye.
Since the 2006 general elections the only other major political current has been the resurgence of “kingdoms” or cultural institutions officially banned from directly participating in partisan politics. In Buganda, the tension between Mengo’s interests and that of the NRM government erupted into spontaneous riots last September which killed 40 people.
It begs the question, say political wonks, whether the influence of organizations or “institutions” representing distinct ethnic groups will be felt in the choices voters make on ballot day. Secondly to what extent political organizations and individual candidates will work with “ethnicity” and its organizations [Tribal councils, Kings and chiefs] to deliver the vote.
Thirdly, if issues that are national in nature and present different policy choices between parties, like job creation, will not be buried under the barrage of ethnic pandering already observable in the political rhetoric.
So far there are broad trends that could be upset by the new profile of ethnic identity associated with the political maneuvering of parties and candidates.
In the last election, officially there were a million Buganda votes, majority of which [700,000] voted for Mr. Museveni and the NRM. After recent events this may well change say some observers.
In none Kingdom areas like Acholi, where the two decade Northern Uganda war has for long been an emotional and ethnic issue- all sub-counties in the last election voted against the NRM.
A similar anti-NRM trend swept West Nile and Lango. Only the constituencies of Vurra and Okoro voted for the NRM in West Nile. Seen by district Koboko, Yumbe, Moyo, Adjumani, Maracha/Terego, Arua, Nebbi, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Oyam, Lira, Apac, Dokolo, Amolatar, Kaberamaido, Amuria, Katakwi, Soroti, Kumi, Pallisa, Bukedea voted for Dr. Kizza Besigye – showing the broader Bantu and non-Bantu divide in electoral outcomes.
In the north east mainly Karamoja votes for Mr. Museveni. Districts in Karimoja have some of the highest percentages for the NRM . Nakapiripirit ranks second amongst all districts in its concentration of NRM votes- with 92% NRM and 5% FDC in the last election.
Political watchers put Kingdoms and districts in the same basket as delivery vehicles for vote delivery which are being competed for. This could therefore produce are much more varied result in 2011 as vote consolidation may be difficult with the involvement of organic actors like cultural leaders.
This week Africa’s youngest monarch, King Oyo Nyimba Kabamba Iguru of Toro reportedly told fellow royals he hosted at his home in Munyonyo this week to work for unity [with the government of President Yoweri Museveni]
On Thursday evening his colorful guests who hail from various traditional kingdoms and fiefdoms from around Africa were expected at State House Entebbe. Patronised by the Libyan leader Muamur Gadaffi the Forum of Kings, Sheikhs, Princes and Traditional chiefs shows some of the political downsides of holding the tail of the cultural politician. Seen largely as a body used by Gadaffi to lobby African governments to accept a continental government – with him as a possible leader; the involvement of Ugandan Kings and chiefs has been strongly opposed by the Ugandan government.
Security briefs painting a picture of Buganda and Bunyoro as a Trojan horse used by Libyan authorities [ and denied by Tripoli] to destabilize the country because Mr. Museveni does not share his continental vision have been variously sent to State House reliable sources claim.
At the heart of it is the fear that Libyan patronage in form of petro-dollars or may be even arms would provide culturally cohesive groups to mount a challenge to the political authority of the government. Perhaps more they may use the cash to mobilize supporters and make their dissatisfaction with the government known at the poll.
In January a planned meeting of cultural leaders in Kampala was banned by the government which also protested their inclusion at an African Union summit by Gadaffi. The two men squared off at the summit in Adis Ababa where those who attended said perplexed African Presidents watched helplessly as voices were raised and threats issued.
Libya was publicly accused by Mr. Museveni of providing money to Buganda during the riots of September at which live bullets were figured at civilians and a clampdown on the press instituted. Such a reaction to the perceived challenge, albeit by the largest and most resilient of the old cultural Kingdoms, betrays the stakes ahead of the next election.

Part of the problem according to a western diplomat based in Kampala is that the organization of power in Uganda though on the face of it appears to be through formal democratic institutions is in fact feudal in nature- with ethnic patronage at its core.
Thus an imperial center which seeks to either negotiate with or subjugate other cultural “empires” runs a high risk of conflict which could be violent as it happened in September.
“I strongly believe cultural institutions will have a big influence in 2011” said Prince Phillip Winyi publicist for Toro Kingdom and coordinator of cultural forums that seek to in his words maintain cultural leaders “above politics”.
Uganda’s unitary republic today shares many things with the medley of Kingdoms, chiefdoms and powerful clan seats from which it was carved by the hand of colonial history almost 150 years ago. Apart from a common ancestry the seat of power fits just one person. Then there is the ceremony, pomp and grandeur that come with the sovereign.
While Kings held perpetual power by virtue of birth; Ugandan presidents are elected every 5 years and exercise only temporal authority. There is a caveat; without presidential term limits since 2005, a president may theoretically extend his “temporal” power indefinitely until death or some unforeseen malady claims him or her.
Since Independence in 1962, after negotiations to tuck in the residual power of Kings left over from the British colonial experiment there has been friction, between the new center of executive authority in Uganda and the bloated remains of the cultural authority of the Kingdoms that preceded it.
In September following the Buganda riots it has become clear that after 47 years cultural power described by Makerere based researcher and monarchist Dr Frederick Gulooba as “ soft power” can be in competition with the “hard” power of the center.
One analyst blames the Museveni government for giving political visibility to cultural Kingdoms and ethnicity in general; legitimizing their own engagement with political competition in which he is involved.
In a lecture titled “Buganda and Uganda at a crossroads” Mamdani in August said the reversion to tribe or tribal organisations especially after the controversial proposal by Mr. Museveni to “ ring fence” elective positions in Bunyoro is a continuation of a colonial policy of “ divide and rule”.
Mamdani argues that by providing different categories of rights based on race or tribe both the colonial government and now the NRM have maximized support.
“The NRM’s governing strategy has been to fragment the population to the maximum, administratively and politically, so as to present it as the unifying force” he said and proposes that Buganda find a leadership of uniting other groups.
“The first step in this project was marked by a program of district creation. New districts have been created at a galloping rate. The number of districts has gone from 33 [1990] to 44 [1997] to 78 [2006] to 80 [June 2009]” Mamdani told his audience.
Asked in various interviews [mostly off the record so as to speak freely] cultural opinion leaders say Kingdoms, especially the big 5 [Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Busoga and even Ankole] will indeed have an impact the calculations of political actors.
And vice versa.
“They [cultural leaders] may not express their political preferences publicly but in the privacy of their palaces they will express themselves” one high ranking royal said.
He said private endorsements of candidates or parties will have the same impact as mobilization of voters. “I expect that monarchists in Buganda will do well” he added.
Buganda however is an easy pick. Mengo is the most politicized cultural institution and following its protracted battle- often on the airwaves- over the land bill- most Baganda will go to the next elections with a political consciousness linked to the demands the Kingdom as made and continues to pursue.
Mengo Minister for research and advocate David Mpanga says because of this the onus is on various political parties “to align themselves” with Buganda’s interests.
“It’s difficult, and not appropriate, to predict the vote for me partly because election results may not reflect the will of the people. There are allegations of rigging and tampering. No proper polling has been conducted to validate the outcome” he said, adding that problems like disputed numbers of voters complicate the debate.
“How will ghosts on the register vote? Are the ghosts Baganda for example” he asks.
In Busoga and Bunyoro- perceived government intervention will have disparate results says FDC publicists and strategist Wafula Oguttu.
“There is a backlash in Busoga because people think the government has interfered in the succession to the Kyabazinga [King]. The killing of [ Lt Aggrey Mwonda, a UPDF officer attached contender Columbus Wambuzi Mulooki] showed the anger of the people” he said.
The Lt. Mwonda died in a suspicious hit and run incident in early October at the height of running battles between two claimants to the throne of the late Kyabazinga Henry Wako Mulooki, a cultural monarch with close personal ties to Mr. Museveni.
Prince William Gabula Nadiope who is competing for the throne has caused a split in Busoga, a place where ordinary folks, according to a former Kingdom Prime Minister Martin Mulumba, have not been close to the Kyabazingaship.
“In many ways government has done to Kingdoms what it did to local councils and districts. Where a Kingdom is strong- it creates small satellite Kingdoms to compete with it” said one source. The source said this explained the tag and pull between the Baruuli/Banyala and Buganda.
In October Charles Mumbere was crowned King of Rwenzururu the latest monarch. While presiding over the function President Yoweri Museveni was briefly interrupted as Dr. Besigye arrived at the event vividly illustrating the political dimensions of the cultural event.

A decision by the Council of Europe- the highest decision making body of the European Union- to urge the Lord’s Resistance Army to sign a peace agreement has been publicly endorsed by Ugandan government officials but experts and officials alike privately expressed skepticism.
In a meeting of its external relations covering the Great Lakes the council asked the LRA to “honour its commitment to sign the final peace agreement” as part of a “comprehensive approach” to dealing with insecurity caused by the LRA and other militias.
“The Council underlines the importance of the Government of Uganda implementing all applicable provisions of the Juba Peace Agreements” minutes from the meeting said also separately calling on peaceful approach to the question of the September riots sparked off by a standoff between the Central government and the Kingdom of Buganda.
“Ugandan Government to resolve any political disputes through peaceful dialogue and democratic institutions” the resolution said pointing out that a “level playing field” should be cultivated ahead of the 2011 elections.
However the principled stand of the EU described by one Ugandan diplomat as “eternal optimism about peace” has often clashed with the pragmatic stance of the government side on the LRA issue and the culture of down and dirty politics especially around elections in general.
The EU is a major funder of a peace and stability architecture for the Great Lakes and invests considerably in peace and democracy programs in countries like Uganda.
“The option [for the LRA] to sign the Final Peace Agreement remains open if there is a change of heart” said Ambassador James Mugume- the chief technocrat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday. Mugume however adds that he personally did not see the rebels signing a peace agreement in the near future.
The LRA shirked putting pen to paper to an agreement which took two years to negotiate and hundreds of man hours by local, regional and international groups. Unlike the EU, Washington was more agreeable to a military solution to extinguish the rebel threat and eventually backed Operation Lightning Thunder [OTF]. The operation, launched in December 2007 as a tri-nation effort, was however not successful in crippling the LRA’s capacity to kill and disrupt civilian lives.
Yesterday Aswa country MP Reagan Okumu said the position of the Acholi Parliamentary Group, one of the key interlocutors during the peace process, was that a peace agreement was the only viable final solution.
“For two reasons. Firstly because the military option has miserably failed and because it is immoral for President Yoweri Museveni to pursue and kill the LRA made up of mainly abductees that his own forces failed to protect” he said.
Since the end of 2007 the LRA path has followed initial intelligence reports that the rebels were heading to Darfur and would be deployed there with the support of the Khartoum government. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army claimed they had rescued 45 people abducted by the LRA in Darfur from an attack which occurred on October 21.

Optimists suggest that the negative outcomes of oil programs of countries like Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Angola, Equatorial Guinea that are the poster child of the “oil curse” can be “potentially” avoided in Uganda. Their argument is that since it’s happened elsewhere why should it happen here unless we are caught sleeping. Unfortunately there are few examples outside South Africa (Botswana is also often cited) on the continent of prudent management of natural resources.

Many countries could have avoided the curse but have not. Hoping for a better future is normal and healthy, but predicting one- as some optimists in Uganda have- is another matter altogether. Those who attempt- and they are invariably politicians or persons at the fringes of the oil industry-arrive at such conclusions by replacing analogy with analysis. It is not unusual to hear commentators say Uganda could go the way of Norway and not say Gabon- where incidentally, the oil company Tullow is the market leader. But what is the basis of this claim? Some technocrats I have spoken to are ebullient about the steps Uganda has taken to apply best practices to the oil sector. Their enthusiasm and hard work notwithstanding the capacity of the Ugandan state remains woefully inadequate in many areas and reform programmes have not been encouraging either. Few processes succeed and are sustained in the management of public affairs from procurement to quality control. Most experts blame this on political corruption. Billions of shillings in local taxes and international aid have been squandered over the last two decades while roads, schools and hospitals suffer a malaise of poor standards. Even those who are optimistic about how oil resources can change this by providing new money must admit that evidence has shown it’s not the lack of money alone responsible for the lethargy in state performance.
Oil is a resource like any other and there is no reason to expect that the criticisms levelled today on the management of the public purse and the attendant problems of corruption, should not be applied to it. And to be fair to those who are optimistic- one could also argue that we could also apply the rate of reform to this situation. Unfortunately again the picture is not good. Despite numerous institutions and global best practices applied by some of the finest minds in Uganda and around the world- progress in prudent management has been slow. Government consultants can fill a room with failed policies and another with new experiments being tried. Most countries that are examples of progressive management of natural resources exhibit better governance and accountability characteristics than those suffering from the oil curse- it’s that simple.
Indeed take two countries that do not have oil and the one with better governance often does better. An upcoming study on this subject am told will show that when two countries with the same governance systems are compared- even if one does discover oil- years later the social indicators remain the same because oil does not work a miracle and suddenly post more accountable governments in countries where its discovered. In Uganda problems have appeared already in two areas related to the governance deficiency here; the secrecy over Uganda’s oil agreements and the management of land rights in the oil zones. A recent audit of expense claims by one oil company which are allowed to recover the cost of their investment showed they were reportedly charging the government for corporate social responsibility programmes such as schools built for the local community. This is a red herring and illustrates the need for independent scrutiny of the agreements. Meanwhile it appears that the flash point of violence in the oil zones will come not because of oil but land. A “land rush” which dubiously preceded the announcement of oil find has sequestered large areas straining the relationship between locals and new interests on the land.

AU_Panel_on_Darfur_Report_October_2009

The Uganda Peoples Defence Forces has said its strategy of hot pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army in far flung areas like the Central African Republic is meant to deny the rebels respite to regroup and return the war theater to Uganda.
“There is no barrier, nothing between [our borders] and the LRA so if we do not pursue them who will stop [Joseph] Kony from abducting? It’s either now or never. If we do not end it Kony could be at our doorstep” said Army and Defence Spokesman Col. Felix Kulaigye yesterday.
The comments come in the wake of grim assessments of local and international efforts to limit the ability of militias in the region from killing, maiming and displacing civilians and undermining state authority.
This week Allan Doss, a UN Special envoy to DR Congo said the support given by UN peace keepers there to the Congolese national army which is fighting the Hutu rebel group FDLR had worsened the situation for civilians.
He later reportedly told the UN Security Council, of which Uganda is a non-permanent member, which pressure should be kept on the FDLR, which like the LRA has been classified as a “negative force” by regional countries.
“Reducing the pressure now would give the FDLR (Hutu rebels) time to regroup and rearm,” Doss told a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the Congo.
Still the UN seems to flip flop on just whether or not keeping pressure should mean allowing its 17,000 strong army to directly engage in the dirty work of fighting rebels. Similarly at the close of the 3-month Operation Lightning Thunder [OLT] which brought together, at least by agreement, the armies of Congo, Uganda, and South Sudan- humanitarian organizations said while it may have inflicted harm of LRA’s military capabilities- its success was undermined by the cost in human lives.
LRA have continued, despite OLT and by extension the current hunt by UPDF, to kill, maim and abduct, seemingly without much resistance in either Congo, South Sudan or Central African Republic military sources say the bulk of their force is located since August.
At the center of the problem on [how international or regional efforts are able to balance civilian protection vis a vis fighting known enemies like the LRA and FDLR] is the question of capacity.
Army sources say continued UPDF operations in Congo and CAR are a huge strain on military budgets. The sources also say that one of the setbacks in the fight against LRA has been “unreliable partners” in the Congolese and Sudanese militaries which were never an integral part of what was meant to be a tripartite operational plan.
Since the end of OLT there has not been little movement in joint operations against the LRA even if the Uganda government has said it has sought permission to expand its operations to CAR.
Moreover little is known about the success or not of the current operations or if the extent to which the army is receiving cooperation from regional or international partners which have so far been critical.
Seen from the expanse of LRA operations in the Congo, CAR and South Sudan and the rate of abductions and civilian deaths attributed to the rebel group- it appears clear that the rebel threat is on ascendancy despite UPDF efforts to contain it.
What is also clear is that the Ugandan army’s strategy of pushing the rebels far from the national border and maintain pressure on them is working.
“The military leadership is committed to pursuing the rebels wherever they are” said Kulaigye yesterday. While good for Ugandan civilians, since the war theater is far from national borders, as long as LRA has capacity to cause harm elsewhere- the rebel threat is still serious.
It also does not completely rule out the LRA has a future menace especially if it receives help in the vast and lawless areas where it operates.
Reports attributed to SPLA say the LRA have been sighted in Sudan’s Darfur region. If true this is consistent with intelligence reports in 2006 that the LRA planned to transit through CAR to Darfur with the purpose of setting up training bases and perhaps being re-inserted into South Sudan either ahead or after the 2011 Referendum on self-government.
If LRA, which has been abducting to beef up its numbers, incubates in Darfur- its days as a military threat to the Ugandan government are not behind it but ahead.
Submitted for the Daily Monitor, Kampala

The posts on this blog have been far and in between largely due to unavoidable circumstances but we are back again.

Angelo Izama [AI]- One would say that there was an intellectual rigor in the 60’s that has vaporized lately-in Ugandan society and Makerere- do you agree?

Ali Mazrui- It is true that there was a lot of intellectual engagement in the 60’s. People were interested in ideas, in comments about current events, in oratory or speech making. [You will tell you] that when I gave a lecture in the Main Hall- although the number of people was quite small, people sometimes gave up their super in order to get a seat. I know it was much rarer at the University of Nairobi or Jomo Kenyatta University in Kenya, than my recollection of Makerere. So there was something about the 60’s which signified considerable intellectual engagement. People were really tuned in and interested. I used to teach my class with some degree of class participation but the system allowed different approaches to lecturing. Although I was head of department I used to teach first year class because then you could reach them [students] when they have first arrived and fresh before my colleagues ruined their minds [laughter].
And I still remember very exciting discoveries about the society even when lecturing for example this business of whether Catholics and Protestants had different accents when speaking English in Uganda. I discovered that when I was lecturing someone would ask me a question and some neighbor would say “Catholic!” and at first I would say hey what’s going on here? But it was reconfirmed here that accents were shaped by the type of school they went to and the schools themselves were in turn influenced by the western countries the teachers came from. So in the case of Catholics the disproportionate number of French and Irish teachers. Protestants had large numbers of English from England and this had consequences for the type of pronunciation they picked up. The French used to be much more significant whereas the English did teach in elite schools and they got hold of the Kabaka who was tutored by upper class English accents from a very young age and they grew up speaking English like members of the English nobility.
So it was learning about Uganda and teaching about the world that made those ten years interesting.

AI: How should a university participate culturally and as a force of ideas in a society like Uganda? Consider this talk of tribalism that is the national moment now.

AM: Maybe not to the same extent as the 60’s but for that sort of key sensitive issue there is participation even today. So there is some participation if the issue is crucial enough and immediate like ethnicity and I remember four or five years ago I discussed military coups and whether Museveni’s presidency had temporarily suspended coup proneness in Uganda and that triggered very heated debate.
So people should be encouraged to participate in the issues of the day and to engage and then people becoming friendly with the regime if they are on the government side, participating as consultants within the government- because participation is not only from the opposition- in helping shape government policy. And then you can have a prime minister appointed from the ranks of the academia. There was no real equivalent in my day and certainly not under Milton Obote. Ironically there was a little more under Idi Amin. He used to raid Makerere for people to be appointed as minister. I narrowly escaped being engaged as special advisor to the President. Abu Mayanja came and said Idi Amin wanted me to be as Henry Kissinger was to Richard Nixon as special advisor. I did not want to be that close not just to him [Amin] but in general to government because one consequence is that although you learn a lot about politics from within you also become very inhibited in your role as teacher. So I told Abu, who was a close friend I could be frank with, how do I deal with this?
Fortunately I had an invitation to go to Britain to give a series of lectures eminently and Abu said well I can tell Amin you have an invitation to go England and then unless he demands you cancel the invitation you can go and find out when you come back whether he still remembers he wanted you [Laughter]. So I tool that advice. Could have been very close to his presidency. I was flattered since I was not a national of Uganda and here he was wanting me to be pretty close to his decision-making process. When I came back Abu came and said you haven’t been in touch so I assume you do not want to become special advisor to the president Idi Amin. I told him I didn’t regard it as appropriate for me. I regard myself as a teacher and being in government would be enormously inhibiting although as a political scientist it would be fascinating and I can write about it later on. So Abu and I decided just to remain silent which we did you see.

AI: Did you ever meet Amin personally?

AM: Oh yes many times. He had this idea that he could solve the apartheid problem in South Africa by sending what he regarded as highly intelligent black people so I became exhibit A. He was ready to send me to South Africa to prove these racists that these black people can think. So he approached me and told me about that and so forth and wrote to the Prime Minister of South Africa [as the head of government was then prime minister other than president] and proposed that I head a delegation of intellectuals to South Africa. The South Africans were in no mood to be dealing with potentially hostile African intellectuals so they politely turned it down.
There was some occasion when he was addressing and as he was walking out he could see me in the audience and indicated that I was to approach him so I did and he explained that the South Africans [would not do it]. I was relieved of course the last thing I wanted was to be exhibit A to racists.
AI: What do you think of these three presidents as people; Milton, Amin and President Museveni who have exerted the most influence on post-independence Uganda? Amin for example gets mixed reviews. Some fear him and others love him.
AM: With the possible exception of King Edward Mutesa who played a slightly different but crucial role to the history of Uganda. My ex-wife and I compared notes on the “Last King of Scotland” since we were together in those ten years. We thought it was a relatively good portrayal of Idi Amin- independently of each other and did not regard it as a distortion. Your idea that people love him or hate him is correct and that he was a mixture of many things is also correct. That he laughed a lot and could be extremely cruel is also correct. None of those are impossible in a single person and many of them were there. If you were in his good books like I was in the beginning [mainly] because I was a public critic of Milton Obote, the man he had just overthrown and also because I was a Muslim intellectual and that was important to him. But I also knew that he was capable of turning against people he had previously regarded as friends in dangerous ways and even their lives might be at stake.
The process under which I decided to leave Uganda; I was I was invited by an American institution called the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in California, Palo Alto before Idi Amin came to power. We decided that now was the time to at least go there and hope that things would quieten down. I was the most the second most visible Makerere person after the Vice Chancellor Kalimuzo who was just abducted and murdered. For his independence the Chief Justice Benedicto Kiwanuka had been picked up from his court and seemingly murdered. Most of them we did not see the bodies but we just knew. Although things were getting pretty bad I still could not decide to leave because I was attached to Uganda. So I went to Palo Alto and when I came back people were really worried because Kalimuzo had been picked up as I was leaving the country [ and were concerned I might never leave again]. My wife at that time waited by the phone in Nairobi terrified in case my fate would be like that of Kalimuzo and the Chief Justice. She waited for my call from Nairobi to the United States to say I was out of Idi Amin’s reach. So many of the things said about him negatively are definitely true. That he had a charm was also true. That he was a rugged ordinary man thrust into the role of head of state with simple ideas of greatness was also true. After I left he really turned against me but by that time I was beyond his reach.
I tried to avoid resigning which was one of my desperate attempts to remain with Makerere. I wrote to the university and said can’t I take indefinite leave without pay and the job you can even give to somebody else provided you left me the option of coming back if things became less life threatening to me. But there was an acting Vice Chancellor at the time who said there was no way you could be absent from Makerere and Idi Amin not notice. And if he noticed you are not there long before he will ask and it would be risky to whoever Vice Chancellor is or whoever is permitting me to be abroad waiting for his fall from power.
The man who was Acting Vice Chancellor at the time, God rest his soul he died a natural death, said there is no way I can give you leave even without pay, even if the job could be advertised. The reasons were cogent and understandable. If I had somebody braver who was Vice Chancellor he might have taken a risk but this particular person wasn’t going to risk what could be life just to make it possible for me to retain my association with Makerere. So I resigned not with a bang but with a whimper because I did not announce it. Many people wanted to turn it into a protest resignation against the regime but I did not want to do it that way so I resigned quietly.

AI: You said you were a public critic of Milton Obote. What was your relationship like with him?

AM: Except for one occasion I never thought even his hostility was life threatening and we had always good relations and good will. I would go to State House and have tea with him. In the one occasion was when he decided to denounce me in parliament and actually sent me an invitation to attend in the gallery so I could hear him abuse me[ Laughter]
So I went. The attack included a threat that maybe somebody will be picked up tonight. It was an incredible performance you see and I regarded it as a major threat. I staggered out of parliament convinced that he meant what he said. There was a British colleague in my department. He has also since passed on. He said I do not think you should sleep in your house tonight. Sue [that’s his wife] and I would be happy to offer you our guest house. I said there is no way I can involve you in this. I really appreciate the offer but if they come to pick me up tonight I will be waiting. So I went back to my house where I found my wife was getting ready to fight them whoever was coming to pick me up [ laughter] but I wasn’t picked up. So next day I talked to the Nigerian Chief Justice [ Udo Udoma] because that night all the news media was discussing the President’s attack on Ali Mazrui. I talked to [Udoma] and asked what do you think is happening? Why does he choose parliament to do it? Why does he invite me to listen? And why does he abuse me in public? [ Udoma] said because he [ Obote] was under enormous pressure to do worse. He could either throw you out; you are not a national of the country. Or lock you up in jail. He did not want to do either although some of his ministers were asking him to do that.
AI: So this was his way of avoiding to make that decision?

AM: Yes. It was to convince his critics that “I am prepared to take stronger action in need be but am not doing it right now. I am disgracing him before the public”.
IP: Why was Obote so hostile to you?
AM: Well the attacks he made in parliament included that I had made a statement in the public lecture in the Main Hall that the Ugandan army made ordinary citizens tremble in their boots when they based. And at that time I could contrast them the Ghanaian army which I did. I said in Ghana if military trucks passed you by you are not terrified that they would might decide stop, pick you up and beat you up or worse.
I do not know when he found out but in his parliamentary speech he included that. He said some people abuse our brave armed forces and whats more they have the audacity to compare them to a foreign army that overthrew its government. The Ghanaian army had overthrown Kwame Nkurumah you see.
And he still had residual problems with regard to my protest over the arrest of the editor of the magazine Transition of which I was associate editor. I had issued a public statement of protest. That was also part of his anger. So the Chief Justice said if I were you I would seek an appointment with him immediately because if he is that angry with you he probably wants you to go and see him so that it creates an impression that you are seeking his clemency. This was terrific advice. So I called him [ Obote] and his secretary said “ just a minute he is about to go into a cabinet meeting”. And she came back and said yes he will see you at eleven [in the morning]. So I made arrangements for my class and went. I spent hours there because he wanted to lecture me on the proper role of intellectuals and how they should make sure they do not endanger stability.
AI: This turned into a debate.

AM: Yes and also he wanted to persuade me to takeover Transition magazine. He said why should the paper that Rajas Nyogi who had according to him had been subversive and published an article by Abu Mayanja in which Mayanja had accused the government of tribalism in the appointment of Judges and both Mayanja and Nyogi were arrested; he wanted to prove that although Transition was one of the nice things about Uganda, it had a major reputation as a English magazine of debate. He said “I could keep it going”. You mean just let this guys rot in jail while I ran the magazine? He said I thought you said the magazine was a valuable institution for Uganda “why should you not keep it going?” [ Laugh] I said well these are my friends you’ve locked up!.

AI: Did you know Museveni before he became President?

AM: Yes. In his leftist days.

AI: When he was still a rabid socialist?

AM: Yes absolutely and he regarded me as a wishy-washy liberal and therefore bourgeoisie. And he even once invited me to a private dinner with his dear wife at Entebbe State House. And in the course of the dinner he said “Professor I hear you have moved to the Left?” I said Mr. President there are rumors you have moved to the right! [Laughter].

AI: What was his reaction?

AM: He rationalized it he said no no.He just begun to take modernization and technology more seriously than he did in his more simplistic leftist days.

AI: He still considers it tactical. The character of his regime still shows a tendency to large social maoist programs like “prosperity for all”.

AM: As you said earlier he is one of the most significant figures in Uganda’s post-independence history. And he has spent slightly longer time than the other time and there are things that he can be given credit for. Like outside the north, stabilization of Uganda. Secondly I know you do not think you are an open society but you are. You express dissent in the media at a level unheard of in the last few years of Obote and much of the time of Idi Amin. But normally we do not like praising governments in power which is also a good idea. We like to attack them and say what lousy performers they are [ laughter] and then we can be more generous after they have gone.

AI: what political direction do you think Uganda will take?

AM: Am still worried about what happens when Museveni steps down, retires or he is taken away by nature because I really believe he has not done enough to make himself dispensible and it is not unique to him because most leaders would rather opt for the belief that they are indispensible and then act on proving to history and themselves that the society cannot do without them. He has become somebody whom you worry whether when he is gone things would disintegrate. I would like to believe that will not happen but Uganda was a relatively fragile political system before he took over power. I am not sure he has done enough to institutionalize stability.

AI. What about Uganda’s experience with corruption?

AM: My position is that you can never end corruption but you can minimize it. But you must assume it is capable of being abolished and act as if it was possible. Neither Uganda or Kenya has done enough. As you know there is also a lot of corruption in the United States. It just takes grander forms and it involves more money.

AI: Does corruption have a special place though in political place as far as political stability and evolution is concerned?

AM: Yes we are more vulnerable and some of our forms of corruption are more obvious. The Americans start a war and make a lot of money from it. Ours because we are relatively smaller political systems are more obvious in our corruption. There has been some debate whether there are positive aspects of corruption which makes things done where they are not done. Thirdly that corruption is a form of income distribution that hijacks resources and you are followed around by thousands of your ethnic compatriots wanting their share [laughter]. But we should do more to take people to court. Just to say that you are against it and do nothing is nonsense. You must find ways in which the guilty are punished.

Foreign Minister Hon Sam Kutesa [NRM, Sembabule] on 22nd July chaired
a United Nations Security Council debate on the theme “ Post-conflict
peace building”. Uganda, a non-permanent member representing African
countries, ends a one-month period as chair of world’s most powerful
body. Here is a text of that interview in which he discusses the Security Council,
peace-keeping and Somalia’s Al Shabaab.
peace-keeping troops. The interview was done at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington DC.
It was submitted to the Sunday Monitor

Sunday Monitor [SM]: Following up on that theme since we come from the Great Lakes
region which successful model on post-conflict peace building would
you point to and say this could work?

Sam Kutesa SK]: Without doubt Burundi. Burundi succeeded because the initiative
was led by the region and the international community supplemented the
regional effort. Earlier on there were attempts to broker a peace
process in Burundi and the Carter Center had been approached and they
tried but by the time President Carter got to know the names of
Burundi [like] Ntugagaganyure, Nkurunzinza, it became a mess so the
region took the initiative. Initially chaired by President [Julius]
Nyerere and then President Nelson Mandela and after that President
[Yoweri Museveni] with South Africa as the facilitator and the UN
backing them. Now you can see the conflict in Burundi has ended, all
the parties are part of government. They have also had elections and
are preparing for another set of elections. So we think that model has
worked.

So in this discussion [on post conflict peace building] we are saying
regional initiatives should be leading supplemented by the United
Nations and the international community. The other outcome is that
when you are involved in peace making do not consider it as one phase.
You should look at peace-making, peace-building simultanasly because
if you concentrate on peace-making and you do not look at peace
building which involves resettlement and development, normally the
experience has shown that after conflict there is a window of about 24
months with people having expectations, settling down and giving peace
a chance, but with no plans for peace-building as you had in
peace-making then you have no program to immediately kick off
resettlement and development and then there is a tendency for
countries to relapse into conflict. Like now, we are working in
Somalia we must take into the need for peace building. In other words,
suppose the conflict ended today, what program do you have to kick off
immediately so that people are not disillusioned and can see the
dividends of peace and lessen the chances of the country relapsing
into conflict.

SM: Uganda has featured prominently in debate of peace versus justice
and which comes first or can they be had simultaneously. What is your
personal take on this?

SK: My view is that you must never condone impunity but at the same
time you must balance the desire to punish the guilty with the need to
establish durable peace and they do not come easy. It a delicate
balance.

SM: Is this the situation Uganda finds itself in with regard to
President Omar el Bashir?

SK: Forget about Bashir lets first talk about Joseph Kony because we
want him prosecuted but at the same as you may have seen in our
negotiations in Juba, we were willing to establish internal mechanisms
of dealing with impunity without compromising durable stability and
security. And indeed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court provides for exhausting local remedies first. In the case of
Bashir, we as Uganda completely support the ICC position that anybody
who commits violations of human rights or engages in genocide aught to
be tried but we are also members of the African Union which passed a
resolution as soon as the indictments were made that we as African
Union should investigate on our own the veracity of these charges and
then take a position. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki who
is heading that investigation is doing so and has been to Sudan and
other countries and will be reporting to the AU.

So we are committed to the ICC and committed to the AU resolution. As
soon as the AU makes its decision then we will comply, as we must with
our ICC obligations.

There is no confusion. I am sure about one thing that President Bashir
is not going to come to Uganda so that should not worry you.

SM: In the case of Somalia you spoke of the continuum between peace
keeping and peace-building. What happens in a situation where there is
no-peace to keep?

SK: We considered this aspect. The primary responsibility of the
Security Council is to maintain world peace and security. That’s the
objective of the Security Council and its only role. So if there is no
peace it is still the obligation of the Security Council to establish
that peace. You have seen it happen in Kosovo and Serbia. Working with
the region you have seen it happen in Burundi, Liberia and Sierra
Leone. So you participate with regional initiatives to establish the
peace, then to keep it and then to build it.

SM: Can that be applied to the current situation because there is a
fully-fledged civil war going on?

SK: What we are doing in Somalia where Uganda is as part of the
African Union Peace Keeping force [AMISOM] is a twin mandate. One is
to protect the Transitional Federal Government and its institutions,
secondly is for us to train Somalis to takeover the security of their
country. In other words as AMISOM train an army and a police force.

Its true that there is a fully-fledged civil war but it is the Somalis
to end that. What we are trying to do on behalf of the Security
Council and the AU is to create capacity in Somalia for the Somalis to
takeover their own security. In 1979 the Tanzanians came and got rid
of Idi Amin. But the Tanzanians could not have hoped to stay there
forever neither would Ugandans accept them. I think the same thing
would happen in Somalia. Ugandans are not supposed to be there
forever. It would be the Somalis who would want to kick us out faster
than anyone else. But what did the Tanzania do? It created the
capacity of the UNLA and withdrew. Then you can have your own internal
conflicts of NRA and so forth. But those internal conflicts are
resolved by Ugandans themselves. So that’s what we are attempting to
do in Somalia; to create the peace by using Somalis and therefore
supporting the TFG

SM: How far is Uganda willing to go to supporting the TFG? Ugandan
peacekeepers are being killed in Mogadishu. If you are saying Somalis
should resolve this themselves at what point to you [leave it to them]

SK: Am not saying they should resolve it themselves but we should help
them to create the capacity to do so and we shall stay for as long as
it takes to create that capacity.

SM: Do you think as AMISOM you have the capacity to prevent the TFG
from collapsing? In the greater scheme of things you are really
protecting a government that has already fallen [being that you have
control over small areas like the Presidential palace]

SK: We are not protecting a government that has already fallen. We are
protecting a government that came in from Nairobi. It only came to
that part. It has never occupied the rest of Somalia and it hasn’t
been kicked out. We are protecting it where it was stationed and we
hope it will expand because the Al Shabaab have no capacity to overrun
us. No capacity at all but its our rules of engagement we are not
involved in pushing them away. That should be done by Somalis who are
trained by us and others under AMISOM. If it was a case of pushing
them away that would not have been a problem. But that’s not allowed
under our rules of engagement.

SM: But would you consider pushing them back considering the present situation?

SK: If the rules of engagement were changed we could but we are also
loathe to become to o deeply involved in local matters. We would
consider it carefully.

SM: Its been reported that Uganda is supplying weapons to the TFG?
Will AMISOM not been seen as the enemy by the other belligerents?

SK: We are not supplying as Uganda. There is a partial lifting of the
embargo [against arms supplies with regard to TFG] and the United
States and other countries who support the TFG are supplying them with
arms. Its true that when the arms come we receive them and hand them
out but we are not the source.

SM: Still won’t the anti-TFG fighters view AMISOM as the enemy?

SK: I would imagine so because we are not just supplying weapons we
have personnel there. Obviously you are already a legitimate target
they already think you are there to stop them from their overall
objective of taking power. We are neutral in this one sense that we as
Uganda have no national interests in Somalia. They have accused the
Ethiopians and Kenyans with whom they share a border of having such an
interest. But as Uganda there is no other earthly reason we are in
Somalia other than to ensure that another African country does not
become a failed state.